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I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
launched the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Debt Relief Initiative. 
The HIPC Initiative created a framework for all creditors, including multilateral 
creditors, to provide debt relief to the world’s poorest and most heavily 
indebted countries, thereby reducing the constraints on economic growth and 
poverty reduction imposed by the debt build-up in these countries. This 
initiative marked a big step forward from the previous approach to over-
indebtedness of developing countries, which had been limited to temporary 
postponements of debt-service payments.1 The HIPC Initiative was modified in 
1999 by key enhancements designed to provide more efficient debt relief 
through a stronger link between debt-reduction and poverty-reduction 
strategies. Under the HIPC Initiative, the IMF and the World Bank boards first 
determine (at the “decision point”) whether a country is eligible for debt relief. 
If an affirmative decision is reached, all creditors (multilateral, bilateral, and 
commercial) are requested2 to commit to provide debt relief once the country 
has satisfactorily carried out certain prescribed policy reforms (the “completion 
point”). The criterion for debt sustainability and the measure of the requested 
debt relief are based on a comparison of the net present value of the country’s 
external debt to its exports (or in certain cases, fiscal revenues). The objective is 
to reduce the country’s external debt to not more than 150% of exports (or, in 
 
Copyright © 2010 by Mark A. Walker and Barthélemy Faye. 
 This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp. 
 * Partner, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. 
**  Partner, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. 
 1. COUMBA FALL GUEYE ET AL., NEGOTIATING DEBT REDUCTION IN THE HIPC INITIATIVE 
AND BEYOND 1 (2007). 
 2. In the absence of a mandatory bankruptcy framework for sovereign debtors, HIPC debt relief 
is provided on a voluntary basis and depends on the commercial assessment, if not the goodwill, of each 
participating creditor of the HIPC debtor. 
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certain cases, 250% of fiscal revenues), which is deemed a sustainable level of 
debt.3 
Depending on the level of a country’s commercial debt, participation of 
commercial creditors in the HIPC Initiative may be a significant factor in 
achieving the HIPC debt-relief objective.4 As legal counsel to certain latecomers 
to the HIPC Initiative, we have dealt with the challenges of applying the 
burden-sharing principle underlying the HIPC Initiative to commercial 
creditors. This article examines salient issues relating to the restructuring of 
external indebtedness owed to private creditors of HIPC countries, focusing in 
particular on the debt-relief mechanisms incorporated in the HIPC Initiative as 
implemented by the IMF, the World Bank, and the Paris Club.5 Our purpose is 
to analyze certain inherent contradictions between the IMF and World Bank-
driven debt-restructuring scheme and a truly market-driven debt-restructuring 
of the kind expected by private lenders. The shortcomings of the debt-
sustainability analysis underpinning the HIPC Initiative may help explain why a 
number of commercial creditors of HIPC debtors have resorted to litigation to 
collect on their claims rather than participate alongside official and other 
creditors in the HIPC Initiative, thus raising significant challenges to one of the 
fundamental principles of the HIPC Initiative: burden-sharing among creditors.6 
 
 3. For more details on the HIPC Initiative, see INT’L MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE EXECUTIVE BOARD FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED APRIL 30, 1999, at 83–90 (1999) 
[hereinafter IMF 1999] (discussing the Executive Board’s analysis of the Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility—providing concessional loans for low-income member countries—and the HIPC 
Initiative seeking to improve the effectiveness of both initiatives in aiding poor developing countries 
achieve growth, external debt viability, and poverty reduction); INT’L MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED APRIL 30, 2000, at 49–61 
(2000) [hereinafter IMF 2000]. 
 4. See GUEYE, supra note 1, at 57. Commercial debt represented between thirteen percent and 
thirty-five percent of the total external debt of countries such as the Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Liberia, and Sudan. Depending on the composition of its external debt, low commercial-creditor 
participation could prevent an HIPC debtor from getting relief from the IMF, which requires creditors 
holding seventy percent of eligible debt to participate at the decision point, and eighty percent at the 
completion point. Id. 
 5. The Paris Club is a forum of official creditors organized under the auspices of the French 
Treasury that convenes to renegotiate bilateral export credits extended or guaranteed by official 
creditors. See generally PARIS CLUB, http://www.clubdeparis.org (last visited Mar. 18, 2010). It is 
currently comprised of nineteen permanent members and has met regularly in Paris since 1956 to 
reschedule bilateral debts. Id. Paris Club creditors meet with a debtor country to agree on common 
terms to reschedule its bilateral export credits as part of the international support provided to a country 
experiencing debt-servicing difficulties and pursuing an economic program supported by the IMF. Id. 
 6. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD FOR THE 
FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED APRIL 30, 1997, at 121 (1997) [hereinafter IMF 1997]. 
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II 
BURDEN-SHARING BETWEEN OFFICIAL AND COMMERCIAL CREDITORS 
Under the concept of burden-sharing, all creditors of a HIPC debtor country 
are expected to provide debt relief in proportion to their share of the net 
present value of debt outstanding at the time of the decision point.7 This 
principle contemplates the comparable treatment of different classes of 
creditors by application of a burden-sharing formula (the “common reduction 
factor”) to the net present value of each class of creditors’ debt stock.8 In 
practice, the IMF and the World Bank determine an acceptable level of 
indebtedness (using the 150% or the 250% target level), compare that amount 
to the net present value of the debt outstanding on a predetermined 
measurement date, and apportion the required reduction among the official and 
commercial creditors based on the common reduction factor.9 If a creditor class 
has granted debt-stock relief after the measurement date, that relief is 
automatically taken into account in calculating the further relief needed to 
comply with the requested HIPC debt-relief effort, since relief is measured by 
comparing the new debt levels with the levels prevailing on the measurement 
date. 
On its face, the use of a neutral mechanism to ensure comparable treatment 
of different classes of creditors seems not only fair, but also efficient, for it 
should in principle eliminate a major stumbling block to negotiations with 
different creditor groups. In the case of official creditors such as the IMF, the 
World Bank, the other multilateral institutions, and the bilateral official 
creditors, this approach seems to work reasonably well. For various political 
and other reasons, official creditors have a common interest and a common 
objective in supporting the efforts of sovereign borrowers to reduce poverty and 
achieve sustainable growth, at least for those borrowers that follow sound 
policies.10 They view themselves as long-term partners of their borrowers and do 
 
 7. INT’L MONETARY FUND, EXTERNAL DEBT STATISTICS, GUIDE FOR COMPILERS AND USERS 
265, 288–90 (2003) [hereinafter IMF 2003]. This rule is supplemented by the “comparability of 
treatment” clause contained in agreements with the Paris Club, which often represents the largest 
creditor bloc of an HIPC debtor. What Does Comparability of Treatment Mean?, PARIS CLUB, 
http://www.clubdeparis.org/sections/composition/principes/comparabilite-traitement/switchLanguage/ 
en (last visited Mar. 18, 2010). In accordance with this clause, the debtor country seeks treatment 
“comparable” to the Paris Club’s agreement from nonmultilateral and private creditors, in particular, 
other bilateral creditors that are not members of the Paris Club. Id. 
 8. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, DEBT RELIEF FOR THE POOREST COUNTRIES: MILESTONE 
ACHIEVED, JOINT STATEMENT BY HORST KÖHLER AND JAMES D. WOLFENSOHN, Chart A, Note 
(2000), www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/2000/state/state.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2010). 
 9. See IMF 2003, supra note 7, at 288; see also, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, CÔTE D’IVOIRE: 
ENHANCED HEAVILY INDEBTED POOR COUNTRIES (HICP) INITIATIVE: PRELIMINARY DOCUMENT 
18 (2009) [hereinafter IMF 2009] (applying the 250% target level to Côte d’Ivoire’s external debt). 
 10. For the vision of international cooperation and mutual assistance among member countries 
that underlies the IMF, see, e.g., the purposes of the IMF as outlined in Article I of its Articles of 
Agreement. 
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not dispose of their debt. As a consequence, treating all official creditors the 
same way after taking account of any prior debt relief which they may have 
granted makes sense as it is both fair and consistent with the policy values of 
official lending. From the debtor’s point of view, any mechanism for the 
allocation of debt relief that is acceptable to the creditors should be acceptable 
to the sovereign debtor as long as the ensuing aggregate external debt and debt-
service requirements do not exceed sustainable levels. The question is, does the 
HIPC approach for allocating debt relief among official creditors make sense 
when applied to commercial creditors. 
In the case of commercial creditors, it is fair to ask two fundamental 
questions: First, in the context of HIPC sanctioned debt relief, are past debt 
relief and the notion of “credit” for past debt relief appropriate factors to take 
into account in restructuring debt owed to them? Second, does the concept of 
equitable treatment of creditors require that claims of commercial creditors be 
reduced in the same way as the claims of official creditors, as suggested by the 
HIPC Initiative?11 As to the first question, commercial creditors do not lend to 
provide policy support to sovereign borrowers. They are commercial actors 
whose debt claims, whether in the form of bank loans or sovereign bonds, are 
generally freely assignable and their business does not require them to hold 
sovereign debt to maturity. On the contrary, they make a decision every day 
whether or not to hold or sell loans. Moreover, the universe of creditors of any 
HIPC country today is unlikely to include more than a handful (if any) of the 
creditors that originally extended credit directly to the borrower. Most creditors 
will have purchased debt in the secondary market, often at substantial discounts 
to face value. Indeed, the commercial debt claims against HIPC countries often 
date back to over twenty years ago.12 If the private external debt of the 
borrower was previously restructured, some existing creditors may have 
participated in the restructuring, but most will not have. Commercial creditors 
do not analyze their position vis-à-vis other commercial creditors based on what 
they paid for their debt or what impairment they may previously have accepted. 
Second, whereas it may make sense for official creditors to acknowledge and 
account for past uncoordinated debt-relief efforts by each of them in 
determining how to allocate equitably future debt relief, there is no market-
based logic in extending this approach to commercial creditors, even when 
those creditors were original lenders to the HIPC debtor country. Established 
 
 11. See, e.g., IMF 2009, supra note 9, at 17 (2009) (“Arrears to bilateral and commercial creditors 
will need to be regularized in the context of discussions on HIPC debt relief and rescheduling with 
those creditors. Any relief already granted by those creditors beyond traditional debt relief mechanisms 
will be credited towards their share in HIPC relief. Côte d’Ivoire has held preliminary discussions with 
both Paris Club and London Club creditors on debt relief and rescheduling.”). 
 12. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, in which we were involved, the commercial debt claims subject to 
HIPC treatment dated back to the 1980s and were securitized in connection with the country’s Brady 
plan transaction in 1998. The country closed the restructuring of its Brady bonds in April 2010. 
Similarly, the commercial debt claims of the Republic of Congo, which were restructured in December 
2007, dated back to the 1980s. 
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practice in private debt markets requires that all claims of unsecured private 
creditors be treated equally, whether the creditors were original lenders who 
paid 100 cents on the dollar for their debt and granted debt relief in the past, or 
institutions that purchased their debt on the secondary market, long after 
default, for a small fraction of its nominal value.13 In fact, outside the realm of 
the HIPC Initiative, whether one looks at private-sector borrowers or sovereign 
borrowers, there is no precedent for granting different treatment to different 
creditors based on when they acquired their debt, on how much they paid for it, 
or on whether they previously suffered a loss through the grant of debt relief. 
The notion of credit for past debt relief—a critical element in applying the 
burden-sharing principle to official creditors—does not accord with how 
commercial creditors value or trade their claims, or comport with market 
practice. In practice, in the absence of official debt, commercial creditors do not 
restructure debt by mechanically crediting past debt relief and then applying a 
common reduction factor. In our experience, the parties generally negotiate a 
restructuring plan that reflects the country’s prospects and that promises some 
reasonable assurance that the debtor country will honor its terms. Moreover, 
the claims of all unsecured creditors are invariably treated identically, 
irrespective of past debt relief or the cost of the claims to the creditors. 
III 
DEBT SUSTAINABILITY AND CAPACITY TO PAY 
Aside from the concept of burden-sharing, another key feature of the HIPC 
Initiative is that debt relief should be based on a formulaic notion of debt 
sustainability. Determining the debt relief a country requires as a function of 
the level of debt it can service on a sustainable basis makes obvious sense, and 
the comprehensive approach to debt relief by different classes of creditors 
introduced with the HIPC Initiative in 1996 marked an important advance.14 
This change was made possible by the decisive involvement of the IMF and the 
World Bank as actual stakeholders in the debt-relief process.15 Thanks to their 
privileged access to the economic and financial information of poor debtor 
countries,16 the Bretton Woods Institutions17 are in a position to base the debt-
 
 13. The London Club steering committees established by the latecomers to the HIPC Initiative 
have generally been comprised of original lenders (traditional banks) and some more recent actors in 
the sovereign debt area (for example, hedge funds). It appears that no one has ever suggested treating 
the claims of these two groups of creditors differently. 
 14. See GUEYE, supra note 1, at 1–3; see also IMF 1999, supra note 3, at 83; IMF 2000, supra note 3, 
at 50. 
 15. Until 1996, the debt-relief process did not include debts owed to multilateral institutions such 
as the IMF, the World Bank, and other international organizations. This was increasingly a problem for 
poor indebted countries, and an impediment to obtaining debt relief from commercial creditors, who 
saw themselves as unfairly disfavored. 
 16. Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 5 of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, the member 
countries must furnish to the IMF such information as it deems necessary for its activities. The Articles 
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relief process (and the computation of their own share of the total debt relief) 
on a debt-sustainability analysis conducted jointly with the authorities of the 
debtor country. 
However, to determine debt sustainability, the HIPC Initiative relies on a 
criterion (the ratio of the net present value of debt stock to exports or fiscal 
revenues) that is both simplistic and imperfect. It differs markedly from the 
approach embodied in negotiated workouts of debt owed by public- or private-
sector borrowers to private financial institutions. Unlike the analysis that any 
well-advised commercial creditor (or debtor, for that matter) would undertake, 
the HIPC debt-sustainability formula is an incomplete and static measure that 
does not accurately measure the ability of a debtor to service its restructured 
debt. 
First, the HIPC debt-sustainability test ignores domestic debt, so it does not 
take into account the debt-payment obligations of the HIPC country vis-à-vis its 
domestic creditors, even though a high level of domestic debt increases the 
likelihood of external-debt distress. Restoring external-debt sustainability does 
not necessarily achieve fiscal sustainability of total public debt; indeed, “[t]he 
latter would target the [present value] ratio of total public (domestic and 
external) debt in relation to appropriately adjusted domestic budget revenues.”18 
The exclusion of domestic debt from the HIPC debt-sustainability calculus is 
also problematic from the standpoint of the commercial creditors. Two essential 
principles of private sector insolvency workouts are that the level of debt relief 
sought by the debtor should be based on a true and full picture of the debtor’s 
payment capacity, and that no class of creditors should be arbitrarily favored.19 
Second, because the debt-sustainability analysis used in the HIPC program 
is frequently based on data that is stale at the time of the negotiations with 
commercial creditors,20 the common reduction factor calculated for the HIPC 
debtor country may ignore facts that are germane to the relief being sought and 
that may figure prominently in negotiations with private creditors. Thus, a 
debtor may invoke the common reduction factor agreed upon by the 
multilateral and bilateral creditors to obtain more relief than its actual situation 
warrants (for example, because of a dramatic shift in its terms of trade after the 
 
of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund were adopted at the United Nations Monetary and 
Financial Conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, on July 22, 1944. 
 17. See About the Bretton Woods Committee, THE BRETTON WOODS COMMITTEE, http://www 
.brettonwoods.org/index.php/167/About_the_Bretton_Woods_Committee (last visited Mar. 18, 2010) 
(noting that the World Bank, IMF, WTO, and regional development banks are known as the “Bretton 
Woods Institutions”). 
 18. See Mothae Maruping, Lessons from Eastern and Southern Africa, in HIPC DEBT RELIEF: 
MYTHS AND REALITY 57, 65 (Jan Joost Teunissen & Age Akkerman eds., 2004) (emphasis added). 
 19. There is an argument, however, that in the case of domestic debt denominated in a country’s 
own currency, where it has the ability to print money and control the money supply, domestic debt 
deserves different treatment from debt denominated in scarce foreign currency, the supply of which is 
finite. 
 20. In our experience, the time often exceeds one year. 
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measurement date).21 Likewise, creditors may invoke the common reduction 
factor to justify a rejection of demands for much-needed relief (for example, 
because exogenous events arising after the measurement date have significantly 
reduced the debtor’s foreign currency revenues).22 
Third, the HIPC test of debt sustainability ignores year-by-year cash-flow 
constraints in that it looks solely to the net present value of debt stock. A 
debtor’s cash requirements and availability are critical to determining its ability 
to meet debt-service requirements. Yet, oddly, the HIPC measure of debt 
sustainability ignores this fundamental element of fiscal soundness. Perversely, 
this approach allows creditors who place a greater premium on rapid repayment 
than on full repayment (because, for example, they regard the risk of renewed 
default beyond the short to medium term as unacceptably high) to insist on 
payment terms that meet the net-present-value test but place a significant 
burden on the debtor country’s cash flow when it can least afford it. 
From both the debtor’s and commercial creditors’ points of view, the HIPC 
debt-sustainability test fails, therefore, to provide a satisfactory measure of a 
HIPC country’s capacity to pay. A sovereign borrower’s capacity to pay is a 
much more subtle and inexact measure than a ratio of net present value of debt 
stock to exports or fiscal revenues. Moreover, in the case of a sovereign 
borrower, the concept of capacity to pay is not just economic, but political as 
well. The ability to pay is meaningless without the political willingness to pay. 
Political and social realities may place limits on the amount of resources that a 
country will, or as a practical matter can, dedicate to servicing its external debt 
as opposed to making other social and economic expenditures. Thus, 
negotiations between the HIPC debtor and commercial creditors focus on 
balancing the creditors’ desire for maximum recovery with the debtor’s desire 
to marshal sufficient resources to fund a program of recovery, poverty 
reduction, and sustainable growth. (The costs of such programs vary widely 
from country to country and are not considered in the HIPC debt-sustainability 
analysis.) These negotiations cannot rely on a mechanical application of the 
HIPC burden-sharing formula and debt-sustainability test. Rather, they tend to 
be lengthier and more difficult because commercial creditors are less likely than 
official creditors to forgive debt merely to protect geopolitical interests or to 
solidify future relationships with the sovereign debtor.23 
 
 21. This was the case of the Republic of Congo, whose financial situation had considerably 
improved between its decision point and the time of the negotiations with its commercial creditors due 
to a steep increase in the price of oil, its key export. 
 22. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the evolution of the domestic political situation had significantly 
impaired its payment capacity compared to what was suggested by the debt-sustainability analysis. 
 23. The composition of the pool of commercial creditors is also sometimes a source of difficulty 
and delays. Today, the holders of the commercial debt of HIPC countries typically include a small, core 
group of bank creditors with continuing commercial relationships in the debtor country (such as trade 
finance, short-term lines for special purposes, hedging operations, and ties to the private sector), as well 
as hedge funds and debt traders that acquired their claims on the secondary market and have no 
particular investment in the country’s future other than the market price of their debt. The perspectives 
and the short-term- and long-term interests of these groups may differ considerably. Notwithstanding 
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IV 
CONCLUSION 
The IMF and the World Bank could make another important contribution 
to the rehabilitation of HIPC countries by helping them develop the data- and 
debt-management policies and human resources to better assess their capacity 
to pay. There is no better incentive for creditors to participate in a debt 
restructuring than the confidence that the basic deal is fair and that the 
borrower has both made a commitment and demonstrated that it believes it to 
be in its own interest to implement sound policies. Under these circumstances, 
linking the restructuring of private and official debt can provide added value to 
all parties: assurance of comparability of treatment, reason to believe that the 
debtor will be able to perform, and the ability of the multilateral institutions to 
couple debt relief with conditionality designed to foster sound policies. 
 
 
 
this divergence of interests, creditors often manifest a strong preference to fix the terms of a debt 
restructuring through negotiation with an ad hoc committee of creditors. Faced with a committee of 
creditors with different interests, a sovereign borrower is likely to find itself on the receiving end of 
proposals that reflect the “lowest common denominator” among the positions of the creditors. 
Experience has shown that this conflict of interest within private-lender committees may hamper the 
progress of sovereign debt negotiations. 
